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Abstract
Policies targeted at high-crime neighbourhoods may have unintended conse-
quences in the presence of organised crime. Whilst they reduce the incentive to
commit crime at the margin, those who still choose to join the criminal organisation
are hardened criminals. Large organisations take advantage of this, substituting
away from membership size towards increased individual criminal activity. Aggre-
gate crime may rise. However, as more would-be recruits move into the formal
labour market, falling revenue causes a reversal of this effect. Thereafter, the
policy reduces both size and individual activity simultaneously.
Keywords: Organised crime; crime policy; occupational choice.
JEL Classification: D82; J24; J28; K42; L21.
1 Introduction
Over recent years, numerous policies have been suggested to increase the expected cost of
engaging in crime. Under normal circumstances, these discourage participation in illegal
activity and cause crime to fall. When applied to neighbourhoods where organised crime
is prevalent, however, they may face a stumbling block. Things may get worse before
they get better: the storm before the calm.
∗I would like to thanks Leonardo Felli, Andrea Galeotti, Gilat Levy, A´kos Valentinyi and Alwyn
Young for their valuable insights. Equally useful have been comments by participants at various seminars
and conferences. Time spent at the Study Center in Gersenzee is also acknowledged.
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Assessments of anti-crime policy have a long history in economics (going back to
Becker 1968). As with any other decision, the rational offender chooses whether to
commit crime by comparing the benefits with the costs. Policy can do little to affect
the gain the offender enjoys from committing crime. Instead, it influences the cost.
For example, increasing the resources available to the police raises the probability of
conviction for any given crime. As punishment becomes more likely, the net benefit to
the offender declines. Raising the severity of punishment by lengthening prison sentences
has a similar effect (Stigler 1970; Polinsky and Shavell 1979; Ehrlich 1981).
More recently, the focus has switched away from traditional law enforcement towards
influencing the opportunity cost of committing crime. Improving labour market condi-
tions involve the offender giving up more in order to engage in criminal activity (Ehrlich
1973). Two real-world examples illustrate. The Perry Preschool Project (c.f. Heckman
et al. 2010) identified poor black children with low IQs. From an early age, they were
given intensive preschool classes. The project better prepared the children for school,
leading to higher educational performance, ultimately improving their labour market
opportunities. The internal rate of return on this project is estimated to be between
seven and ten per-cent. As a by-product, participants’ criminality also fell. This sort of
intervention is proving increasingly popular. More recently, the Paper Project has pro-
vided financial incentives to students in poor U.S. neighbourhoods to encourage school
attendance and better exam performance (Fryer 2011).
All of these approaches have proved successful in reducing the number of individuals
involved in crime, in line with the predictions of the rational offender model. However,
in the presence of organised crime, there is evidence to suggest that they may backfire.
During the 1980s, arrests for heroin and cocaine trafficking in the U.S. rose dramatically
(from 4% of all drug arrests in 1980 to almost 20% in 1989) as part of the ‘War on Drugs’
(Lee 1993). Successful conviction of traffickers increased (from 85% in 1985 to 92% in
1989) and they were incarcerated for longer periods of time (up from 61 months to 76
months on average). However, over the same period, surveys suggest that availability of
both drugs increased, and drugs prices were stable. Various attempts have been made to
explain this outcome based on the unique features of the drugs market. Consumers may
have changed their purchasing behaviour, buying larger quantities less often (Lee 1993).
The market structure itself might have changed, depending upon whether distributors or
retailers are targeted (Poret 2002). Competition could have increased, lowering the price
(Mansour et al. 2006). It is certainly true that the drugs market underwent significant
changes during this period. If backfiring policies were limited to this case, we might
have little more to say. However, other examples exist.
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In 1990, the Philippines customs authority clamped down on common forms of duty
avoidance (Yang 2008). Evidence suggest that, as a result of the policy, not only had
other forms of duty avoidance increased, but that the problem of avoidance may have
got worse. Whilst the government raised an additional $24.6 million from additional
inspections, it is estimated that displacement towards other forms of avoidance cost an
additional $33.3 million in lost duties over a fifteen month period. Not only had criminal
groups substituted between different activities, but the overall cost of crime increased.
The policy had backfired due to substitution between activities.
In response to the London riots of 2011, the Metropolitan Police developed a strategy
of arresting known gang members in several neighbourhoods in London. One year later,
a survey asked residents of these neighbourhoods to assess its impact (Centre for Social
Justice 2012). They stated that gang violence had increased. Despite the arrests, those
who remained at liberty became more violent. A more recent report suggests that gang
violence has subsequently declined (Home Office 2013). This indicates that the backfiring
effects may be temporary.
In an attempt to explain these phenomena, I assess the impact of law enforcement and
labour market policies in a simple model of profit maximisation.1 A criminal organisation
generates revenue by recruiting members to engage in criminal activity. In exchange for
their efforts, it pays them a wage. These members are drawn from a neighbourhood in
which the organisation is the sole employer of criminals. Many criminal groups recruit
in this way, from mutually exclusive geographical territories, ethnicities or even families
(Jankowski 1991; Polo 1997; Paoli 2003). By doing so, it is easier for them to maintain
the loyalty of their members, preventing defections to other groups or the police.
Individuals in the neighbourhood have varying criminal ability. Evidence suggests
that informational asymmetries abound in organised crime (Gambetta 2009). Signalling
of ability, for example through the use of violence, is a pervasive method for gaining
membership (Decker 1996; Skaperdas 2001), advancement or respect (Jankowski 1991;
Silverman 2004). As such, criminal ability is private information. Members with higher
ability incur a lower cost of activity. This could represent the effort involved in com-
mitting crime. It could also incorporate the inherent dangers involved in this line of
work. For example, members of a drugs gang in Chicago have been found to have a 25%
chance of dying in four years (Levitt and Venkatesh 2000). This compares with a 0.4%
chance in the same demographic across the U.S. as a whole.
1There is a rich history of modelling organised crime as a profit-maximising firm. For recent con-
tributions to this literature, see, for example, Gambetta 1996; Anderson and Bandiera 2000; Garoupa
2000; Chang et al. 2005; Kugler et al. 2005 or Dixit 2007.
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Each individual either accepts the contract offered by the organisation, or works in
the formal labour market. Since it is assumed that all individuals have the same labour
market opportunities, the contract acts as a simple screening device. All members
receive the same wage, and engage in the same amount of activity. For those with a
high criminal ability, membership provides them with a large surplus. Individuals with
low ability find the the wage the organisation offers is insufficient to compensate for the
activity required of them. They instead join the formal labour market. The contract
ensures that recruits are from the upper tail of the criminal ability distribution.
When a policy increases the cost of engaging in crime, the surplus each would-be
member enjoys declines. Those with relatively low ability no longer choose to join
the organisation. The policy appears to be effective, as the number of criminals falls.
However, individual criminal activity may have become more profitable. Those who still
join are hardened criminals. The compensation they require for the acts they commit
falls, making it less expensive for the organisation to raise individual activity (a cost
effect). Yet, with fewer members, increases in individual activity have a smaller impact
on the aggregate amount of crime the organisation commits, and hence on the revenue it
generates (a revenue effect). Whether individual activity becomes more or less profitable
depends upon the relative size of these effects.
Left to its own devices, the organisation maximises profit by employing a large num-
ber members. It recruits individuals with very low ability. When a policy causes these
would-be members to move to the formal labour market, the organisation need not in-
crease its wage by as much to compensate remaining members for increased activity.
The cost effect is large. Conversely, diminishing marginal returns imply that the rev-
enue effect is small. Size and individual activity are profit substitutes. Reductions in
membership cause the organisation to increase the activity of its remaining members.
For large enough organisations, aggregate criminal activity will increase. This is the
storm.
As the policy continues to increase the cost of engaging in crime, and the size of the
organisation continues to decline, the revenue effect becomes important. Reductions in
size lead to smaller declines in the marginal cost of activity, as those who leave already
have relatively low effort costs. Diminishing marginal returns are also less restrictive.
Size and activity eventually become complements. Further reductions in size cause the
organisation to reduce the activity required of its members. Overall crime falls rapidly.
This is the calm.
Two recent theoretical contributions to the crime literature also discuss substitution
within the context of a gang (Poutvaara and Priks 2009; 2011). In their analysis, the
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gang’s leader enjoys being head of a large, violent group. Following a change in police
tactics (2009) or unemployment (2011), they show that the gang leader may reduce
membership in favour of more violent activity. The relative price of size changes, and
the leader maximises utility by substituting towards violence. The intuition in my
contribution is similar. In contrast, I identify two effects (revenue and cost) which jointly
determine the relationship between members and their individual effort. This enables
me to not only discuss profit complements and substitutes in the same framework, but
also to discern a link between the size of the organisation and how it views the two
inputs. These insights generate a new prediction about the reaction to policy. Whilst
membership always falls, individual (and, potentially, aggregate) criminal activity will
first increase, then stabilise, before rapidly declining.
The model presented is not implicitly one of organised crime - it could equally apply
to a firm in the formal economy facing increasing labour market wages. Here too,
there is evidence of substitution from the literature on work sharing (beginning with
Calmfors 1985 and Booth and Schiantarelli 1987). These contributions assume that
a firm’s output depends upon total hours worked (individual hours multiplied by the
number of workers). My approach nests this assumption. Empirical estimates for the
elasticity of substitution between size and individual hours range between −0.1 and −1.7
(for a survey, see Freeman 2000). The upper estimates are consistent with the view that
aggregate activity increases when the number of workers falls. Whilst organised crime
is, of course, different with regard to the constraints it faces, this nevertheless suggests
the possibility that it too may substitute, and that this could result in greater amounts
of crime.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines a simple model
of organised crime. Section 3 discusses the equilibrium, highlighting the link between
organisation size and whether size and activity are complements or substitutes. The
following two sections identify the impact of a gradual improvement in formal labour
market conditions or an increase in the expected punishment on the optimal size and
activity. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are provided in the appendices.
2 A Simple Model of Organised Crime
A criminal organisation recruits members from a neighbourhood with a population of
mass N . Although its product markets may be competitive, the organisation acts as a
monopsonist employer in the crime sector. The neighbourhood may be a geographical
territory, or may represent an ethnicity or collection of families. It offers an identical
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contract to everyone in the neighbourhood, comprising of a wage, g and a level of
individual criminal activity a.2 The contract is binding on both sides.
Individuals vary in their intrinsic criminal ability, denoted by σ ≥ 0. Ability is
exponentially distributed, with parameter λ > 1. An individual’s ability is not observed
by the organisation (there is adverse selection). Their effort cost of criminal activity a
is given by a
σ
. The cost is increasing in the level of activity required by the organisation,
but more able individuals always suffer less. Given the nature of the contract, those with
high ability consequently enjoy a greater surplus from membership of the organisation
than those with low ability.
The organisation’s members also face the risk of punishment. With probability p
they are caught and suffer punishment −f . Following convention, they are still assumed
to receive the benefit of their crime - the wage from the organisation - irrespective of
whether they are punished (Garoupa 1997, 2000). For simplicity, both the probability
of being caught and the punishment an individual receives is independent of the level
of individual activity and size of the organisations. Whilst this is perhaps unrealistic,
it is not obvious what alternative assumption would be more appropriate given that
all members engage in identical crimes. With limited police resources, an increase in
criminal activity reduces the probability that any particular offence will be punished
(Sah 1991). However, greater activity can lead to greater resources being made available
(Levitt 1997), which may reverse the relationship.
The payoff from accepting the organisation’s contract is thus:
g − a
σ
− pf. (1)
If, instead, an individual chooses not to become a criminal then they receive a flat
wage, w. This is equivalent to the expected wage from employment in the formal labour
market, and may include the cost of investment in education. The assumption that all
individuals have identical formal labour market opportunities reflects the fact that many
workers from crime-ridden neighbourhoods perform low-skilled jobs, where variation in
wages is small (Levitt and Venkatesh 2000).
The organisation recruits M members in order to generate revenue r(M,a).3 Revenue
2A previous working paper considers the case in which the organisation offers different wages in
exchange for different activity levels (Long 2013). The effects are similar, although the intuition changes
slightly.
3The black box nature of revenue (as opposed to production) is purely for notational ease. One can
think about it as an indirect revenue function: the one resulting from the optimal allocation of inputs
across the wide range of activities the gang engages in. Kugler et al. 2005 consider a more structured
approach, decomposing revenue into the number of crimes committed, and the booty collected from
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is subject to diminishing marginal returns to either input and, for simplicity, is assumed
to have constant returns to scale. Size and activity are revenue complements: the
marginal revenue product of activity, MRPa, is not only increasing in M , but also
diminishes more slowly as M increases. The extent of revenue complementarity proves
important in the analysis to follow. One measure of this is the cross elasticity of the
marginal revenue product of activity with respect to size:
η(M,a) =
M
MRPa
∂MRPa
∂M
. (2)
η states the percentage increase in the marginal revenue from activity following a one-
percent increase in organisation size (η > 0). Since marginal revenue is one half of a
firm’s profit-maximisation decision, η intuitively tells us how the organisation’s incentive
to increase activity varies when its size increases. When η is large, size and activity are
strong revenue complements. An increase in size creates a strong incentive to increase
activity, as it will bring in much more revenue.
The organisation chooses its contract to maximise profit, given by its revenue minus
its total wage bill:
pi(M,a) = r(M,a)− gM. (3)
Summarising, the timing is as follows. The policy environment is first announced,
and becomes common knowledge. The criminal organisation then chooses its contract.
Next, individuals choose whether to join the organisation or to work in the formal sector.
Crime then takes place and wages are paid. Finally, members of the organisation may
be arrested and punished.
3 Equilibrium
Solving this simple framework yields a (semi-separating) perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Proceeding by backwards induction, first consider the choice of the neighbourhood’s
individuals. Given the contract on offer, an individual will work for the organisation if
and only if:
g − a
σ
− pf ≥ w
⇐⇒ σ ≥ σˆ(g, a, w + pf) ≡ a
g − (w + pf) .
each crime. If we normalised the price of criminal output to unity, this specification of production would
be identical to that of Calmfors 1985 and Booth and Schiantarelli 1987.
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The payoff from joining the organisation is increasing in ability. All members receive the
same wage, engage in the same amount of criminal activity, and face the same expected
punishment. However, those with higher ability have a lower cost of committing crime.
The formal labour market, on the other hand, does not respect criminal ability. Everyone
receives w. So there exists a unique marginal individual, with ability σˆ(g, a, w + pf)
defined above, such that only those with ability exceeding that of the marginal individual
join. Whilst the marginal individual is indifferent between either form of employment,
all other members of the organisation receive a positive surplus. Individuals with ability
below σˆ strictly prefer working in the formal labour market. Since crime is always
prohibitively costly for those with ability close to zero, σˆ(g, a, w+pf) > 0. The contract
acts as a very simple screening device. The required level of individual activity provides
a hurdle which only those with sufficiently high ability are willing to overcome.
Note that all policy tools in this framework, w, p and f , have the same impact on
the ability of the marginal individual. By raising the expected cost of engaging in crime,
each policy reduces the surplus that members receive from joining the organisation.
Fewer individuals accept any given contract. The ability of the new marginal individual
is higher. As we are only interested in the composite effect of policy, we denote by
φ ≡ w + pf , the expected cost of engaging in crime. In the following sections, we will
ask how changes in φ affect the organisation.
We now turn to the choice of optimal contract. It proves helpful to rephrase the
organisation’s profit maximisation problem slightly. For a given wage, g, individual
activity, a, and cost of engaging in crime, φ, the expected size of the organisation is:
M(g, a, φ) = Ne−λσˆ(g,a,φ). (4)
Size has a one-to-one relationship with g. Rather than choosing the contract, (4) suggests
a different approach: the organisation chooses its size, M , and individual activity level,
a. Knowing how individuals respond in equilibrium, it then rearranges (4) to identify
the ability it needs to make indifferent:
σˆ(M) =
lnN − lnM
λ
.
The organisation then computes the wage needed to achieve this indifference, given its
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chosen individual activity level and the expected cost of engaging in crime. It needs:
g(M,a, φ)− a
σˆ(M)
− pf = w
⇐⇒ g(M,a, φ) = φ+ a
σˆ(M)
. (5)
The wage it offers just compensates the marginal individual for both the expected cost
of engaging in crime (φ) and the effort cost of the activity the organisation requires of
them. Infra-marginal members receive a positive surplus from joining, given by:
g(M,a, φ)− a
σ
− pf − w = a
σˆ(M)
− a
σ
≥ 0.
Members with higher ability always receive a greater surplus from the contract on offer
than members with lower ability.
The organisation’s profit maximisation problem can thus be rewritten as:
max
M,a
{r(M,a)− g(M,a, φ)M}, (6)
where g(M,a, φ) is defined by (5). Any unconstrained solution must satisfy the following:
Proposition 1 (First-order Conditions) Suppose that η > 1
2
. Then the profit max-
imisation problem (6) has a solution, (M∗, a∗) > 0, given by:
MRPM(M
∗, a∗) = g(M∗, a∗, φ) +
a∗
λσˆ(M∗)2
, (7)
MRPa(M
∗, a∗) =
M∗
σˆ(M∗)
. (8)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The assumption that η > 1
2
is sufficient to ensure that all solutions to this system lo-
cally maximise profit. Equation (7) describes the first-order condition for size. Given in-
dividual activity, a∗, new members increase the organisation’s revenue byMRPM(M∗, a∗).
However, they must be paid g(M∗, a∗, φ). Moreover, attracting new members involves
recruiting those with lower ability than the current marginal individual. All individu-
als with higher ability already receive a positive surplus from membership, and hence
have already chosen to join. In order to compensate for the new recruits’ higher cost of
activity, the organisation must increase its wage (in (5) the ability of the new marginal
individual has lower ability). This involves offering higher compensation to the infra-
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marginal individuals too. The marginal cost of members exceeds g(M∗, a∗, φ).
Equation (8) gives the first-order condition for activity. Increasing the level of individ-
ual activity enables the organisation to generate more revenue. Each member commits
more crime, and total revenue increases by MRPa(M
∗, a∗). However, in order to ensure
that no member chooses to switch towards the formal labour market, the organisation
must compensate them for the higher effort cost that they incur. The member requiring
the greatest payment is the marginal individual. From (5) the organisation must raise
its wage by 1
σˆ(M∗) . However, all M
∗ members receive this pay rise. The marginal cost
of activity is thus M
∗
σˆ(M∗) . Note that (8) is independent of φ. Whilst increasing the ex-
pected cost of engaging in crime affects an individual’s decision to join the organisation,
it does not impact upon their effort cost of criminal activity. In particular, controlling
for organisation size, the ability, and hence the effort cost, of the marginal individual
is unaffected. Increasing activity requires the same increase in wages and results in the
same overall increase in the organisation’s wage bill.
The profit-maximising level of individual activity and organisation size can be de-
scribed as the point of intersection between two restricted demand curves, M˜(a) and
a˜(M). Each curve gives the optimal choice of one input, for any given quantity of the
other. They are implicitly defined directly from the first-order conditions, as follows:
MRPM
[
M˜(a), a
]
= g
[
M˜(a), a, φ
]
+
a
λσˆ
[
M˜(a)
]2 , (9)
MRPa [M, a˜(M)] =
M
σˆ(M)
. (10)
For each a, the solution to equation (9) states the organisation’s profit-maximising size.
Equation (10) has a similar interpretation for activity. Profits are maximised when both
equations are satisfied, as size maximises profit given individual activity and activity
maximises profit given the organisation’s size. The restricted demand curves provide a
very intuitive way to assess the endogenous effects of changes in the policy environment
on the organisation’s optimal choice of inputs. Also, by substituting a˜(M) for a in (9),
we can express the organisation’s profit-maximisation problem in terms of a single input,
M . Understanding the shape of these curves in more detail is hence our next task.
Consider how an increase in size impacts upon the marginal profitability of activity,
given by (8), at the profit-maximising combination of inputs:
∂
∂M
(
∂pi
∂a
)
=
1
σˆ(M)
{
η(M,a)−
[
1 +
1
λσˆ(M)
]}
. (11)
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Whether individual activity becomes more profitable depends upon the sign of the term
in curly brackets.4 The first element, η(M,a), states the percentage increase in the
marginal revenue product of activity following a one per-cent rise in size. It represents a
revenue effect. With more members, a small rise in each member’s individual activity
leads to larger growth in aggregate crime and hence in the organisation’s revenue. Size
and activity are revenue complements. The second term is the percentage increase in
the marginal cost of activity. It represents a cost effect. When membership expands,
the new marginal individual has a lower ability. They require a greater increase in wages
to compensate them for higher individual activity. All infra-marginal members receive
the raise too, exacerbating the problem. The marginal cost of individual activity also
increases in size.
Activity only becomes more profitable following an increase in size if the revenue
effect dominates the cost effect. As alluded to in the introduction, this has important
implications for how the organisation responds to a change in the policy environment.
Fortunately, we can easily distinguish between the two cases:
Proposition 2 (Complements vs. Substitutes) There exists a unique M ≥ 0 such
that the revenue effect dominates the cost effect if and only if M < M .
Proof. See Appendix B.
M
N
SubstitutesComplements 1 + 1
λσˆ(M)
η [M, a˜(M)]
1
M
Figure 1: Size and Activity can be Complements or Substitutes.
Figure 1 illustrates. From (11), the cost effect only depends upon the size of the
organisation. As size increases, the ability of the marginal individual declines. The cost
effect is increasing in size. In contrast, when we incorporate endogenous changes in
4These effects are, of course, entirely symmetric. (11) also describes ∂∂a
(
∂pi
∂M
)
.
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activity using (10), the revenue effect is declining. The figure has two regions. Small
organisations only recruit very high ability individuals. Any increase in activity only
requires a small rise in wages. The cost effect is small, and is dominated by the revenue
effect. Size and activity are profit complements. Larger organisations, on the other
hand, are forced to recruit lower ability individuals. Any increase in activity necessi-
tates a much larger rise in wages in order to maintain the indifference of the marginal
individual. The cost effect is very high. Moreover, the revenue effect is small. If size
is large enough, it is dominated by the cost effect. In this region, size and activity are
profit substitutes. Where the two curves intersect, the revenue and cost effects exactly
cancel each other out. An increase in activity has no effect on the optimal size of the
organisation and vice-versa.
The restricted demand functions clearly behave differently depending upon whether
size and activity are complements or substitutes. Their respective slopes are:
∂M˜
∂a
= −
∂2pi
∂M∂a
∂2pi
∂M2
,
∂a˜
∂M
= −
∂2pi
∂M∂a
∂2pi
∂a2
.
If size and activity are complements (that is to say that ∂
2pi
∂M∂a
> 0), an increase in
activity causes an endogenous increase in size. As each member is more active, additional
members will bring in more revenue. The marginal revenue product of size is higher (the
revenue effect). However, greater activity requires greater compensation for the marginal
individual. Increasing size worsens the problem by attracting individuals who are more
sensitive to crime. The marginal cost of size increases too (the cost effect). Since size
and activity are complements, the revenue effect dominates, and size optimally increases.
The restricted demand for size, M˜(a) is upward-sloping.
The effects are symmetric. An increase in size causes an endogenous increase in
activity. As size grows, the organisation is better placed to generate revenue through
activity. The marginal revenue product of activity is higher (the revenue effect). Con-
currently, it is forced to recruit less able members, which increases its wage bill (the cost
effect). Since size and effort are complements, the revenue effect dominates, increasing
the marginal profitability of activity. The organisation asks its members to work harder.
The restricted demand for activity, a˜(M) is also upward-sloping.
If, on the other hand, size and activity are substitutes, the cost effect dominates the
revenue effect. An increase in activity reduces the marginal profitability of size. M˜(a)
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is downward-sloping. Similarly, an increase in size reduces the marginal profitability of
activity. a˜(M) is also downward-sloping.
Finally, if M = M , then size and activity do not affect one another. Both curves are
stationary.
a
M
M˜(a)
S
M˜(a)
a˜(M)
C
M N
Figure 2: Profit-Maximising Size and Activity Level.
Figure 2 displays the restricted demand functions. The diagram can be split into
two sections. Considering the region to the left of M in isolation, size and activity are
complements. The revenue effect dominates. Both restricted demand curves are upward
sloping. As the organisation’s size increases, the inputs’ complementarity weakens ( ∂
2pi
∂M∂a
approaches zero). From Figure 1, the difference between the revenue and cost effects
declines. An increase in size causes a smaller endogenous increase in activity (a˜(M)
becomes less steep). An increase in activity causes a smaller endogenous increase in
size (M˜(a) becomes steeper). When M = M , ∂
2pi
∂M∂a
= 0, so the restricted demand for
activity achieves a maximum, whereas the the restricted demand for size asymptotes
towards infinity.
In the complements region, profit is maximised at point C. At C, size maximises
profit given the level of individual activity (we are on the M˜(a)-curve) and activity
maximises profit given size (we are also on the a˜(M)-curve). Since the restricted demand
for activity becomes less steep as size increases, whereas the restricted demand for size
becomes steeper, the curves can only intersect once. C is unique.5
Turning attention to the region to the right of M , size and activity are substitutes.
The cost effect dominates, and the restricted demand curves are downward sloping. As
the size of the organisation increases, the difference between the cost and revenue effects
5The uniqueness is guaranteed by the assumption that η > 12 . From the second-order conditions for
profit maximisation, at any point of intersection between the restricted demand functions we have that,
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gets larger (see Figure 1). The inputs become stronger substitutes. An increase in size
causes a larger endogenous decline in individual activity (a˜(M) becomes steeper), and
vice versa (M˜(a) becomes less steep).
In the substitutes region, there is also a profit-maximising point, S, where the re-
stricted demand curves intersect. Once again, S is unique, due to how changing size
affects the slopes of both curves.6
Considering the whole range of inputs on offer to the organisation, we have two
candidates for the profit-maximising combination of inputs, C and S. Fortunately, one
offers strictly higher profits than the other:
Proposition 3 (Profit Maximisation) Suppose that the profit-maximising size of the
organisation at S is strictly greater than M . Then S is the unique profit-maximising
combination of inputs for the organisation.
Proof. See Appendix C.
At either C or S, profit is positive. Making use of Euler’s Theorem, profit at any
point where the restricted demands for both inputs intercept can be calculated as:
pi(M∗, a∗) =
M∗a∗
σˆ(M∗)
[
1 +
1
λσˆ(M∗)
]
Using (10) to substitute for a∗, this can be shown to be increasing in the size of the
organisation. Since size at S is larger than at C, and the restricted demands intercept at
both points, profit must be higher at S. Left to its own devices, the profit-maximising
if ∂
2pi
∂M∂a > 0:
∂2pi
∂M2
∂2pi
∂a2
−
(
∂2pi
∂M∂a
)2
> 0,
⇐⇒ |
∂2pi
∂M2 |
∂2pi
∂M∂a
>
∂2pi
∂M∂a
|∂2pi∂a2 |
,
⇐⇒ 1
∂M˜
∂a
>
∂a˜
∂M
> 0.
Noting that the slope of the M˜(a) curve in Figure 2 is 1
∂M˜
∂a
, the restricted demand curve for size is
steeper than the restricted demand curve for activity whenever they intersect. They can therefore only
intersect once.
6The assumption that η > 12 is sufficient for uniqueness. The proof is identical to the case with
complements, except that ∂
2pi
∂M∂a < 0 . Thus:
1
∂M˜
∂a
<
∂a˜
∂M
< 0.
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criminal organisation will operate in a region where size and individual activity are
substitutes.
4 The Storm
We now begin to consider the impact of a steady increase in either the wage that indi-
viduals would earn in the formal labour market, w, or the expected punishment from
crime, pf . The organisation is operating at the point where the restricted demand curves
intersect. The effect of increasing the expected cost of engaging in crime can be seen by
asking what happens to these restricted demands.
Consider first the effect of an increase in φ = w + pf on the profitability of size,
holding individual activity constant. From (9):
∂M˜
∂φ
=
1
∂2pi
∂M2
< 0.
When φ increases, the surplus each member enjoys from the organisation declines. The
marginal individual, who was indifferent between employment in either sector, now
prefers the formal labour market. If the organisation wishes to maintain its size, it
must increase the wage it offers in order to restore this indifference. This increases the
marginal cost of size. New recruits must be paid more. MRPM(M
∗, a∗), on the other
hand, is unaffected. The increase in φ makes size less profitable for any level of individual
activity. The restricted demand for size shifts left.
Turning to the profitability of individual activity for any given size, from (10), we
have:
∂a˜
∂φ
= 0.
The increase in φ has no impact upon the marginal cost of activity. For a given organi-
sation size, the marginal individual has the same ability, and hence faces the same effort
cost. Varying activity whilst maintaining this individual’s indifference thus necessitates
the same change in wages. Similarly, MRPa(M
∗, a∗) has not changed. For any given
organisation size, the level of individual activity maximises profit is unchanged. The
restricted demand for activity does not shift.
From Proposition 3, the organisation initially operates in the substitutes region.
Figure 3 shows the impact of the policy change: the M˜(a) curve shifts left. Whilst it
is clear that the policy is effective at reducing membership, it has had an unintended
consequence.
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M
a˜
N
M˜0
S0
M˜1
S1
Figure 3: Activity Increases with Substitutes.
For every level of activity, the organisation’s optimal size has fallen. Due to revenue
complementarity between inputs, the marginal revenue product of activity declines. In
(10), this provides the organisation with an incentive to reduce activity. However, as
it now recruits fewer members, the ability of the new marginal individual is higher.
The remaining recruits require less compensation for greater individual activity. The
marginal cost of activity has also declined. Since size and activity are substitutes, the
cost effect dominates, and the organisation chooses to increase its activity.
The rise in individual activity generates further endogenous effects. The surplus
each member receives from being part of the organisation declines. For the marginal
individual, this is sufficient to cause them to prefer the formal labour market. In order to
maintain its size, the organisation would have to increase the wage it offers. The marginal
cost of size has gone up. At the same time, greater individual activity means that
new members generate more revenue for the organisation. However, in the substitutes
region, this increase in MRPM is not sufficient to maintain the profitability of size. The
organisation reduces its membership further.
The secondary reduction in membership leads to further endogenous increases in
activity, which further impacts upon membership. Eventually, in Figure 3, the profit-
maximising combination of inputs moves from S0 to S1. Whilst the organisation has
fewer members, each member is more prolific. This is the storm.
Proposition 4 (The Storm) An increase in the expected cost of engaging in crime,
φ, initially reduces size, but increases individual activity.
Proof. See Appendix D.
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How bad can things get? On the one hand, the organisation is smaller. This reduces
aggregate crime. On the other, each member is more active, increasing it. If activity
increases enough, the aggregate amount of crime could increase.
Corollary 1 (Aggregate Crime) There exists Mˆ > M such that, if M > Mˆ either
an increase in the expected cost of engaging in crime will raise aggregate crime, M∗a∗.
Proof. See Appendix E
For large organisation, the cost effect is huge (it approaches infinity as M approaches
N , see Figure 1). The marginal individual has very low ability. Small increases in
activity require a very large increase in compensation, both due to the large number of
members and the sensitivity of marginal individual. When policy reduces the size of the
organisation, the marginal cost of activity declines very rapidly relative to the marginal
revenue product. The organisation optimally increases individual activity more than
proportionally. In effect, the restricted demand for activity is elastic with respect to
size. This is consistent with the higher estimates of the elasticity of hours with respect
to workers reported by Freeman 2000. As size declines, total criminal activity increases.
As the policy reduces size further, the revenue effect becomes important (in Fig-
ure 1 the gap between the revenue and cost effects decline). Whilst individual activity
continues to increase, it becomes less responsive. Eventually, the restricted demand for
activity becomes inelastic. At this point, further improvements in the formal labour
market or increases in expected punishment lower the total amount of criminal activity
the organisation commits (consistent with the lower estimates in Freeman 2000). Nev-
ertheless, individual criminal activity increases. This could represent a greater number
of the same type of crime being committed, or a movement towards more serious crime.
As the policy environment continues to increase the cost of engaging in crime, the
marginal cost of size grows. Size declines and activity increases. Both of these changes
raise the marginal revenue product of size. However, this cannot continue indefinitely.
In the substitutes region, size is bounded below by M and effort is bounded above by
a˜
(
M
)
. So:
MRPM(M
∗, a∗) ≤MRPM
[
M, a˜
(
M
)]
.
The marginal cost of size faces no such restriction. In fact, it is bounded below by
φ. As φ increases, the compensation the organisation must provide its members grows
indefinitely. Eventually, the marginal cost of size increases above the marginal revenue
product. At this point, the organisation reaches a corner solution with M = M , and
the policy appears to become ineffective:
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Proposition 5 (Impasse) There exists φS > 0 such that, when φ increases above φS
size and individual activity become unresponsive to the changing policy environment.
Proof. See Appendix F.
φS is defined by:
MRPM
[
M, a˜
(
M
)]
= g
[
M, a˜
(
M
)
, φS
]
+
a˜
(
M
)
λσˆ
(
M
)2
⇐⇒ φS ≡MRPM
[
M, a˜
(
M
)]− a˜ (M)
σˆ
(
M
) [1 + 1
λσˆ
(
M
)] , (12)
the expected cost of engaging in crime at which M becomes the optimal organisation
size in the substitutes region. Since, when φ = φS, M is (unconstrained) optimal size
in the substitutes region, by Proposition 3, the profit it generates still strictly exceeds
that of any combination of inputs in the complements region. It is therefore the unique
profit-maximising organisation size. Profit-maximising individual activity is given by
a˜
(
M
)
.
As φ rises above φS, although profit declines rapidly, M still maximises profits. It
is optimal in the substitutes region, and offers greater profits than any combination of
inputs in the complements region. Changing the policy environment appears to have
run out of steam. Size and activity are unresponsive. Of course, this is not sustainable...
5 The Calm
As the expected cost of engaging in crime continues to increase, the profits the organ-
isation continue to decline. Stuck in a corner solution, the organisation is unwilling to
adjust its size and activity, but must nevertheless pay out higher wages to its members.
Whilst profits in the complements region also decline in the face of this increasing cost,
the greater flexibility afforded by an interior solution curtails the rate at which they
fall. The benefits from producing in the substitutes region is reduced. Eventually, the
organisation finds it profitable to switch:
Proposition 6 (Calm) There exists φC > φS such that as the expected cost of engaging
in crime increases above φC, size and activity both decline.
Proof. See Appendix G.
Having moved production into the complements region, the impact of further in-
creases in the φ are shown in Figure 4:
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Figure 4: Activity Decreases with Complements.
As before, an increase in φ exogenously increases the marginal cost of size. Without
a corresponding exogenous increase in its marginal revenue product, the organisation
recruits fewer members. In Figure 4, the M˜ curve shifts in to M˜3. This has two effects.
Firstly, the marginal revenue product of activity falls (the revenue effect). Secondly,
those who are still recruited have relatively high ability. They consequently need little
compensation for the criminal activity they engage in. The marginal cost of activity also
falls (the cost effect). Since the organisation is operating in the complements region, the
revenue effect dominates, and the marginal profitability of activity falls. The decline in
size causes an endogenous decrease in activity.
The endogenous effects that were so troublesome in the substitutes region now re-
inforce the impact of the policy. The decline in activity reduces the marginal revenue
product of size. Since each member engages in less crime, new recruits generate smaller
increases in aggregate crime, and hence in the organisation’s revenue. However, lower
wages are needed to attract low ability individuals to the organisation. In the com-
plements region, the revenue effect dominates, and lower activity makes members less
profitable. The organisation further reduces its size.
The secondary fall in size leads to further declines in individual activity. Eventually,
the organisation’s profit-maximising input combination moves from C2 to C3, consisting
of both fewer members and lower activity. Now, increases in the cost of engaging in
crime lead to rapid declines in both the organisation size, and the extent of its criminal
activities.
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6 Conclusions
Recent years have seen numerous innovative policies put forward to tackle high-crime
neighbourhoods. These approaches tend to be based upon a rational offender argument.
Increasing the expected punishment a criminal suffers or improving formal labour market
conditions increase the expected cost of engaging in crime. The offender weighs up these
higher costs against the benefits they enjoy from successfully committing crime. The
crime rate falls.
The presence of organised crime may confound this argument, at least initially.
Whilst those on the margin do indeed move away from a life of crime, the criminal
organisation reacts by adjusting its recruitment policy. Those who still opt for a career
in the organisation are hardened criminals. They require relatively little compensation
for engaging in criminal acts. With this in mind, the organisation substitutes away from
a large, inactive membership towards a small, prolific one. This may help to explain
evidence suggesting that policy can backfire in the presence of organised crime.
All is not lost, however. As the size of the organisation continues to fall, the endoge-
nous effects that hampered the policy now reinforce it. With so few recruits, increasing
each member’s individual activity does little to increase the organisation’s revenue. Con-
versely, its costs continue to grow, as members must be compensated for their efforts.
This counteracts the incentive to substitute. Eventually, the organisation switches to a
strategy whereby increasing the expected cost of engaging in crime reduces both its size
and the amount of crime each of its members commits.
The model presented herein is simple. As such, it generates the stark results neces-
sary to illustrate the underlying intuition. In particular, it is assumed that changes in
policy do not impact upon the marginal cost of individual activity. In many cases, this is
accurate. Increases in a minimum wage or the number of vacancies in a neighbourhood
simply raise the opportunity cost of engaging in crime. They do not affect the marginal
cost of one more criminal act within the organisation. Similarly, more police on the
streets or tougher sentences across the board (even if different crimes warrant different
punishments) will simply raise the expected cost of punishment - they act as a fixed
cost associated with each crime. However, if more serious crimes saw their expected
punishment rise more sharply than less serious crime, then criminal activity would be-
come more costly at the margin. This would generate an exogenous decline in individual
criminal activity. Such policies may help mitigate the storm. Stretching the metaphor
a bit far, perhaps, they are all-weather policies.
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Appendices
Throughout the appendices, I will use subscript to denote derivative. For example,
rM =
∂r
∂M
and rMa =
∂2r
∂M∂a
.
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The first-order conditions for the profit maximisation problem are:
piM = rM(M
∗, a∗)− g(M∗, a∗, w)− a
∗
λσˆ(M∗)2
≡ 0,
pia = ra(M
∗, a∗)− M
∗
σˆ(M∗)
≡ 0.
The associated second derivatives are:
piMM = rMM(M
∗, a∗)− a
∗
λM∗σˆ(M∗)2
− 2a
∗
λ2M∗σˆ(M∗)3
,
piMa = rMa(M
∗, a∗)− 1
σˆ(M∗)
− 1
λσˆ(M∗)2
,
piaa = raa(M
∗, a∗).
Diminishing marginal returns guarantee that piMM < 0 and piaa < 0. For (M
∗, a∗) to
constitute a maximum, we therefore require that:
piMMpiaa − pi2Ma > 0.
Using the fact that r(M,a) has constant returns to scale and Euler’s theorem, this
condition is satisfied if and only if:
η(M∗, a∗) >
λ2σˆ(M∗)2 − 2λσˆ(M∗) + 1
2λ2σˆ(M∗)2 + λ(2 + a∗)σˆ(M∗) + 2λ
.
A sufficient condition is that η(M,a) > 1
2
.
Finally, it is necessary to show that the organisation does not wish to shut down.
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Making use of constant returns to scale:
pi∗ = M∗rM(M∗, a∗) + a∗ra(M∗, a∗)− g(M∗, a∗, φ)M∗
= M∗
[
g(M∗, a∗, φ) +
a∗
λσˆ(M∗)2
]
+ a∗ra(M∗, a∗)− g(M∗, a∗, φ)M∗
=
a∗M∗
λσˆ(M∗)2
+ a∗ra(M∗, a∗) > 0,
where the second line comes from substituting (7) for rM(M
∗, a∗). The organisation
makes positive profits. This completes the proof.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Firstly, consider the first-order condition for a given by (8). For each M , this
gives the a that maximises profit. Let us denote this restricted demand for a by a˜(M),
defined implicitly by:
ra [M, a˜(M)]− M
σˆ(M)
≡ 0.
We can now consider whether size and effort are complements in equilibrium purely
as a function of M . Consider (11). For any M size and effort are complements if and
only if:
η [M, a˜(M)] ≥ 1 + 1
λσˆ(M)
. (13)
As M increases, σˆ(M) falls, and so the right hand side increases. Moreover, 1 +
1
λσˆ(M)
→∞ as M → N .
Taking derivative of the left hand side with respect to M :
dη [M, a˜(M)]
dM
=
∂η
∂M
+
∂η
∂a
da˜
dM
=
(rMa +MrMMa)ra −Mr2Ma
r2a
− MrMaara −MrMaraa
r2a
rMa − 1σˆ − 1λσˆ2
raa
=
MrMaara −MrMaraa
r2a
1
σˆ
+ 1
λσˆ2
raa
,
where the simplification makes use of Euler’s Theorem once again. If MrMaara −
MrMaraa > 0 then η declines as M increases. Since rMaa > 0 by assumption, the
left hand side of (13) is declining in M . So there exists a M ≥ 0 such that, when
M ≥M the cost effect comes to dominate the revenue effect. This completes the proof.
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C Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 1, the profit generated by at any point of inter-
section between the restricted demand curves is:
pi∗(M,a) =
aM
λσˆ(M)2
+ ara(M,a)
=
aM
σˆ(M)
[
1 +
1
λσˆ(M)
]
,
where the second line comes from substituting for ra(M,a) using (8). We can assess
what happens to profit as we move along the a˜(M) curve, increasing M :
pi∗ [M, a˜(M)] =
a˜(M)M
σˆ(M)
[
1 +
1
λσˆ(M)
]
.
So:
dpi∗ [M, a˜(M)]
dM
=
∂pi∗
∂M
+
∂pi∗
∂a
da˜
dM
=
a˜
σˆ
(
1 +
1
λσˆ
)
+
a˜
λσˆ2
(
1 +
2
λσˆ
)
+
M
σˆ
(
1 +
1
λσˆ
)
rMa − 1σˆ − 1λσˆ2
raa
=
a˜
λσˆ2
(
1 +
2
λσˆ
)
− M
raaσˆ2
(
1 +
1
λσˆ
)2
> 0.
Now, it must be the case that the organisation size is greater at S than at C. So the
organisation makes more profit at S than C. This completes the proof.
D Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to (7) and (8), we have that:
M∗φ =
piaa
piMMpiaa − pi2Ma
< 0,
a∗φ = −
piMa
piMMpiaa − pi2Ma
.
Size unambiguously falls. Since size and activity are substitutes, piMa < 0. So a
∗
φ > 0.
This completes the proof.
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E Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Aggregate criminal activity is given by M∗a∗. Differentiating with respect to φ:
∂M∗a∗
∂φ
= M∗φa
∗ + a∗φM
∗
=
piaaa
∗ − piMaM∗
piMMpiaa − pi2Ma
.
So ∂M
∗a∗
∂φ
> 0 if and only if:
piMaM
∗ − piaaa∗ < 0
⇐⇒ M∗rMa(M∗, a∗)− M
∗
σˆ(M∗)
[
1 +
1
λσˆ(M∗)
]
− a∗raa(M∗, a∗) < 0.
Making using of Euler’s Theorem (noting that ra(M
∗, a∗) is HD0), we require:
η(M,a)− 1
2
[
1 +
1
λσˆ(M)
]
< 0.
The first term is the revenue effect. The second term is half the cost effect. Since
the revenue effect declines in M and the cost effect increases towards infinity as M
approaches N , for large enough M this must be negative. Moreover, if M = M the
revenue and cost effect are equal, so the term above is still positive. There therefore
exists a unique Mˆ ∈ (M,N) such that for M > Mˆ aggregate crime increases. This
completes the proof.
F Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. In the substitutes region:
rMφ(M
∗, a∗) = rMMM∗φ + rMaa
∗
φ > 0.
From the previous proof M∗φ < 0 and a
∗
φ > 0. As φ increases, the marginal revenue
product of size increases. Moreover, conditional on M ≥M :
rM(M
∗, a∗) ≤ rM
[
M, a˜
(
M
)]
.
24
So, if:
φ ≥ φS ≡ rM
[
M, a˜
(
M
)]− a˜ (M)
σˆ
(
M
) [1 + 1
λσˆ
(
M
)] ,
then M∗ = M and a∗ = a˜
(
M
)
. The organisation has reached a corner solution. When
φ = φS, M is the unconstrained profit-maximising organisation size. By Proposition
3, the organisation makes strictly more profit than it would it were to switch into the
complements region. As the wage continues to increase, the organisation thus prefers to
remain at
(
M, a˜
(
M
))
. This completes the proof.
G Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. The proof is presented in two stages. We first compare the profit from the
optimal input combination under complements to that when size is M , summarising the
result in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 There exists φC such that, for all φ ≥ φC the organisation makes more
profit using an input combination in the complements region than it does using an input
combination in the substitutes region.
Proof. The proof consists of two steps. Firstly, I show that, for high enough φ, the
profit from optimal input combination under complements exceeds that when size is M .
Secondly, I show that, as φ increases, profit when size is M decline more rapidly than
when size and activity are complements.
The profit when size is M is given by:
pi
[
M, a˜
(
M
)]
= r
[
M, a˜
(
M
)]−Mφ− Ma˜ (M)
σˆ
(
M
) .
So, for:
φ >
r
[
M, a˜
(
M
)]
M
− a˜
(
M
)
σˆ
(
M
) ,
we have that pi
[
M, a˜
(
M
)]
< 0. Now, with complements, we always have an interior
solution. So:
pi∗(M,a) =
aM
σˆ(M)
[
1 +
1
λσˆ(M)
]
≥ 0.
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For high enough φ the profit under complements exceeds that under substitutes. More-
over:
dpi
[
M, a˜
(
M
)]
dφ
= −M,
dpi[M, a˜ (M)]
dφ
∣∣∣∣
M<M
= −M.
Since, under complements, M < M we have that−dpi[M,a˜(M)]
dφ
> −dpi
dφ
∣∣
M<M
. pi
[
M, a˜
(
M
)]
and pi [M, a˜ (M)]|M<M can only intersect once as φ increases. Call the expected cost
of engaging in crime which equates the two profit functions φC . For all φ above φC ,
pi [M, a˜ (M)]|M<M > pi
[
M, a˜
(
M
)]
.
Following on from the proof of Proposition 4, size unambiguously falls. However, in
the complements region, piMa > 0, and so a
∗
φ < 0. Activity also declines. This completes
the proof.
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